The transformation of political party opposition in Malaysia and its implications for the electoral authoritarian regime by Ufen, Andreas
www.ssoar.info
The transformation of political party opposition




Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz
frei zugänglich. / This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and
a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Ufen, A. (2009). The transformation of political party opposition in Malaysia and its implications for the electoral
authoritarian regime. Democratization, 16(3), 604-627. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340902884804
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.




The transformation of political party opposition in Malaysia and its implications 








Malaysia’s electoral authoritarian system is increasingly coming under pressure. Indicators of this are the 
metamorphosis of opposition forces since 1998 and, in particular, the results of the 2008 parliamentary elections.  From 
1957 until 1998 political party opposition was fragmented. An initial transformation of political party opposition began 
at the height of the Asian financial crisis, after a major conflict within the ruling United Malays National Organization 
in 1998. However, the regime was able to weaken the opposition, resulting in its poor performance in the 2004 elections. 
Afterwards, in a second transformation that has continued until the present time, an oppositional People’s Alliance 
(Pakatan Rakyat) has emerged that now has a serious chance of taking over the federal government. This article argues 
that the increase in the strength and cohesion of political party opposition since 1998 has been caused mainly by five 
combined factors: the emergence of pro-democratic segments within a multi-ethnic and multi- religious middle class; 
the intensified interaction of political parties and civil society forces; the impact of new media; the eroded legitimacy 
of the  United Malays National Organization and other parties of the ruling coalition; and the internal reforms within 
the Islamist Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam SeMalaysia). Consequently it has become conceivable that the 
country will incrementally democratize in a protracted transition. Although the 1999 and 2008 elections were not 
foundational, they have been transitional. They may not have inaugurated a new democratic regime, but they have 
marked important phases in the struggle for democracy in Malaysia. 




Malaysia has been conceived of as ‘semi-democracy’, ‘syncretist state’, or ‘repressive-responsive regime’.1 
These terms denote the hybrid character of the regime, located somewhere in the grey zone between democracy 
and ‘full’ author- itarianism. With reference to recent debates on various regime types, the country is best 
understood as a competitive electoral authoritarian regime. These regimes: 
 
neither practice democracy nor resort regularly to naked  repression.  By  organizing periodic elections they try to obtain 
at least a semblance of democratic legitimacy, hoping to satisfy external as well as internal actors. At the same time, by 
placing those elections under tight authoritarian controls they try to cement  their continued hold on power.2 
 
Elections are inclusive and pluralistic, but not fully competitive and open.3 Such electoral authoritarian regimes 
differ from electoral democracies with sufficiently free and fair elections and hegemonic electoral authoritarian 
regimes where elections are not competitive and opposition parties are doomed to lose.4 The concept of electoral 
authoritarianism is used here because any potential transition to democracy in Malaysia will most probably occur 
primarily in the electoral arena. Mass protests are quickly transferred into the party system. Elections – possibly in 
combination with party-switching – are competitive enough to allow for a change of government and, then, of 
regime. 
In Malaysia, elections are not fair since basic political rights and civil liberties are restricted.5 Limitations to press 
freedom6 and to the right to associate and assemble, malapportionment, gerrymandering, and the financial 
advantages of the ruling parties are testimony to the systematic violation of fairness principles. In Malaysia the 
governing coalition – initially the Alliance, and from the early 1970s on the Barisan Nasional (BN) (National 
Front) – has won every election at the federal level. The Alliance – an inter-ethnic coalition of the  United Malays 
National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malaysian Indian Congress 
(MIC) – ran successfully for the  first time in the municipal elections of 1952. The BN, the successor to the Alliance 
founded in the early 1970s, consists of 13 parties, many of which solely or overwhelmingly represent specific 
ethnic groups; that is, the Malay majority (53.4% of the population), the Chinese and Indian minorities (26.0% 
and 7.7%, respectively), or the main ethnic groups in East Malaysia. 
The dynamics of party politics have changed substantially since 1998, following the Asian financial crisis. 
Particularly since the 2008 elections, the national political opposition has become more cohesive than ever before. 
It is led by a charismatic and internationally esteemed former deputy prime minister; it governs in a range of 
states; it is able to mobilize large segments of civil society; it has disposal over a vibrant alternative media; and 
it has a chance of taking over the federal government. 
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According to different variants of modernization theory, Malaysia has many prerequisites for democracy such as a 
large middle class, a low poverty rate, and long-lasting high economic growth. The country is integrated into the 
world economy and has favourable colonial legacies, a tradition of peaceful conflict resolution, and a participatory 
political culture. In addition, it is situated in a region where neighbouring countries have experienced a transition 
from authoritarianism to electoral democracy. Yet, as has been observed by Przeworski, such ‘objective factors 
constitute at most constraints to that which is possible under a concrete historical situation but do not determine the 
outcome of such situations’.7 
A huge part of transition theory has focused more on the strategic choices   of actors. In the same vein, Howard 
and Roessler stress the ‘importance of elite strategies and incumbent-opposition dynamics in competitive 
authoritarian regimes, versus structural factors and prior degrees of political liberalization’.8 However, an analysis 
of the typical ‘four-player game’ of transition, with hardli- ners and softliners among regime elites and with 
radicals and moderates in the opposition,9 does not work in Malaysia today. Instead this article argues that the 
potential transition to democracy in Malaysia will not be pacted according to  the model as advanced by authors 
such as O’Donnell and Schmitter. Rather, it will be a ‘protracted transition’ where ‘legal but restrained opposition 
groups (usually political parties, sometimes in tandem with labour unions, business groups, or other 
representatives of civil society) debate political liberalization, step by step, strategic interaction by strategic 
interaction, over the course of years and decades’.10 The 1999 and 2008 elections, then, have not been founda- 
tional, but transitional. They have not inaugurated a new democratic regime, but they have marked a new phase 
in the struggle for democracy in Malaysia. 
Democratization in Malaysia has been blocked for a long time, not only because of repression but also, and 
especially, because of the inability of oppo- sition forces to cooperate effectively. From independence in 1957 
until 1998 the opposition was fragmented and weak. The first transformation of political party opposition began 
at the height of the Asian financial crisis, after a major con- flict within the ruling UMNO in 1998. The emerging 
Reformasi movement ushered in the formation of the Barisan Alternatif (BA) (Alternative Front),      an alliance 
of opposition parties, ahead of  the  1999  elections.  The  regime  was subsequently able to fragment and weaken 
opposition,  resulting  in  its  poor performance in the 2004 elections. The movement as a whole was too  weak 
to endure because of an Islamist reversal in the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) (Parti Islam SeMalaysia), the 
resulting tense relationship between PAS and the Democratic Action Party  (DAP),  and  the  regained  strength  
of the UMNO and the BN. The latter was due, in turn, to the economic recovery, the events of 11 September 
2001, and the concomitant scapegoating of radical Islam. Afterwards, in a second transformation, the opposition 
parties overcame their rivalries, while the legitimacy crisis of UMNO and other BN parties reached its peak in 
2007/2008. Consequently, an oppositional People’s Alliance (Pakatan Rakyat) that is more cohesive than the 
BA has emerged. 
This article argues that the transformation of political party opposition in Malaysia has been caused mainly by 
five combined factors: the emergence of pro-democratic segments within a multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
middle class; the intensified interaction of political parties and civil society forces; the impact of new, uncensored 
media; the erosion of legitimacy of the UMNO-led ruling coalition Barisan Nasional; and internal reforms in the 
Islamist PAS. The article draws on findings from a three-year project based on more than 50 interviews, primary 
documents, and participant observation, focusing on events that occurred from 1998 until after the watershed 2008 
parliamentary elections.11 Concluding remarks summarize the main findings of the analysis and discuss the wider 




Political party opposition before Reformasi 
For a long time, electoral authoritarianism in Malaysia was more hegemonic than competitive in character due to 
a fragmented and emaciated opposition. Those political parties that tried to break the hegemony of the ruling 
elites faced severe repression. By the time Malaya gained independence in 1957, a once-strong Communist Party 
was severely weakened; two smaller socialist parties, the predominantly Malay Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM) 
(Malaysian People’s Party) and the Chinese-dominated Labour Party, merged into the Socialist Front. However, 
both were unable to win more than eight seats and two seats in the 1959 and 1964 elections, respectively. At the 
federal level the Alliance was able to sustain its two-thirds majority in the 1959 elections as well as the 1964 
elections. PAS, at that time more a Malay nationalist than an Islamist party, won majorities in state parliaments only 
in the economically backward north. Eventually, the dominance of the Alliance was considerably shaken. In the 
May 1969 elections it obtained only 74 out of 144 seats at the federal level. The polarization between competing 
political parties during the election campaign led to ethnic rioting just after the elections in May 1969. As a result, 
a state of emergency was proclaimed (until 1971) and the Alliance was extended to become the National Front 
(BN). In order to avoid further ethnic unrest, the BN integrated some smaller parties and even PAS (from 1973 to 
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1977). The BN won at least 83% of the seats in the national parliament in the elections in 1974, 1978, 1982 and 
1986,  against  an  opposition consisting largely of PAS (since 1978) and the social democratic and pre- dominantly 
Chinese DAP. Practically speaking, these two parties did not cooperate. However, during the mid-1980s a part of 
the opposition established a loose alliance.12 
This alliance preceded two coalitions formed in 1990 that were interlinked through Semangat ’46, a party that 
broke away from UMNO in the wake of a major leadership crisis in 1986/87.13 One alliance, the Islamic Muslim 
Unity  Movement (Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah), was a coalition of Semangat ’46 with PAS. The other, the 
Malaysian People’s Front (Gagasan Rakyat Malaysia), consisted of Semangat ’46, the PRM, and the DAP, amongst 
others. Such an unorthodox construction of two parallel pacts was largely the result of pro- grammatic differences 
between PAS and the DAP. In 1990 the opposition won 49 out of 180 seats (in 1986, 29 out of 177) (see Table 1). 
Nevertheless, these alliances ultimately collapsed due to a range of disagreements.14 Religious and ethnic 
cleavages complicated the creation of a cohesive coalition. Within the BN, UMNO could use its ethnic cleavages 
Table 1. Seats in the national parliament since 1990 (most important parties). 
 
 1990 1995 1999 2004 2008 
Barisan Nasional 127 162 148 198 140 
UMNO 71 88 72 109 79 
MCA 18 30 28 31 15 
PBB 10 13 10 11 14 
MIC 6 6 7 9 3 
Gerakan 5 7 7 10 2 
Opposition 49 30 45 20 82 
PAS 7 7 27 7 23 
PKN (since 2004, PKR) – – 5 1 31 
DAP 20 9 10 12 28 
PBS (since 2002, part of the BN) 14 8 3 a a 
Semangat ’46b 8 6 – – – 
Total 180 192 193 219 222 
Note: UMNO, United Malays National Organization; MCA, Malaysian Chinese Association; PBB, United Traditional Bumiputera Party 
(Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu); MIC, Malaysian Indian Congress; Gerakan (Party Gerakan, Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia); PAS, Pan-
Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam SeMalaysia); PKN, National Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Nasional) – since 2004, PKR, People’s Justice 
Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat); DAP, Democratic Action Party; PBS, United Sabah Party (Parti Bersatu Sabah). aFour seats for the BN. 
bBreakaway party from the UMNO; most of its members returned to the UMNO in 1996. 
Source: Election Commission of Malaysia. 
 
complicated the creation of a cohesive coalition. Within the BN, UMNO could use its unchallenged hegemonic 
role to settle such conflicts author- itatively. Besides, the government employed an array of propaganda and 
repressive means to discredit and shatter the opposition. BN member parties profited from an extensive patronage 
apparatus. However, heavy disputes occurred within the UMNO and the BN as soon as the cash flow came to a 
halt; for instance, during the economic crises in 1986 and 1998/1999. 
 
Reformasi and the Barisan Alternatif 
In 1998 a new opposition force that fundamentally altered the political landscape was created. At that time 
UMNO and the BN experienced the worst crisis since their inception as the country was hit by the worst economic 
slump since indepen- dence. Moreover, fundamental socio-economic shifts came to the surface. The new 
opposition movement was based mainly on a new middle class with a large Malay segment.15 This new Malay 
middle class now consisted of managers and professionals working in the private and the state sectors whereas it 
earlier encompassed mainly schoolteachers and other civil servants.16 Whereas in 1970 only 4.9% of the 
professionals were Bumiputera (‘sons of the soil’), this number increased to 28.9% in 1999.17 Moreover, 
ownership of the share capital of limited companies rose considerably among the Bumiputera from 2.4% in 1970 
to 20.6% in 1995. These Bumiputera are officially composed of Malays (approximately five-sixths of the 
Bumiputera) as well as other indigenous groups such as the Dayak, Melanau, Bajau, Kadazandusun, and Murut, 
who all enjoy constitutionally guaranteed privileges. The implementation of the New Economic Policy and the 
New Education Policy – that is, ‘affirmative action’ measures in favour of the Bumiputera – in the early 1970s 
has since caused dissatisfaction not only among the Chinese and Indians, but also among rural Malays who have 
hardly benefited from the policy shift. Nevertheless, parts of this new middle class de-emphasize ethnicity and 
religious exclusivism through ‘new patterns of ethnoreligious interaction’.18 One indicator is the improvement of 




important changes are occurring in the way businesspeople develop their firms, prob- ably due to the impact of generational 
change. Changes in business strategies, organ- isational structure and management style within these firms suggest that new 
generations of ethnic Chinese and Malays, unlike their forebears, appear more inclined to forge inter-ethnic business ties.19 
 
The state-led liberalization of education and cultural policies has also contributed to ‘a new spirit of cooperation 
and acceptance across ethnic divides’.20 All this has facilitated bonding among ethnic groups that had commonly 
been divided and was one reason for a rapprochement of opposition groups. It has to be kept in mind, however, 
that this middle class is fragmented. Particularly those who are dependent on the state still tend to support the BN.21 
The Reformasi movement22 itself was triggered by a controversy between Prime Minister Mahathir and his deputy 
Anwar Ibrahim. Mahathir identified a western conspiracy as well as currency speculation by George Soros as the 
causes of the Asian financial crisis. Anwar Ibrahim, in contrast, spoke of self- inflicted problems due to the close 
linkage of economics and politics. He also held a number of unproductive megaprojects responsible and refused 
to subsidize the troubled Renong Group as well as the shipping company owned by Mirzan Mahathir, the prime 
minister’s son.23 While Mahathir rejected help from the Inter- national Monetary Fund and the World Bank, Anwar 
welcomed International Monetary Fund support and mobilized foreign media in his favour. There are even 
indications that Anwar and his supporters tried to overthrow Mahathir, his former mentor, as party leader at the 
UMNO general assembly in June 1998.24 Eventually, Anwar was sacked as finance minister and Mahathir’s 
deputy due to ‘moral impropriety’. In the weeks preceding his detention over charges of sodomy and corruption, 
a new protest movement emerged in solidarity with him.25 The conflict thus spilled onto the streets. After 
numerous mass protests, never before seen in Malaysia, two alliances were established in September 1998. One 
was Gagasan Demokrasi Rakyat (shortened form: Gagasan, Coalition for People’s Democracy), consisting 
largely of non-governmental organizations (NGOs); and the other was Gerakan Keadilan Rakyat Malaysia 
(shortened form: Gerak, Malaysian People’s Movement for Justice), which included NGOs as well as the 
DAP and PAS. In December the Pergerakan Keadilan Sosial (Adil, Movement for Social Justice) was founded. 
It was led by Anwar’s wife, Wan Azizah, and the well-known NGO activist Chandra Muzaffar. They decided to 
form a political party in order to participate in the coming elections. Adil thus became the Parti Keadilan Nasional 
(PKN) (or keADILan, National Justice Party) in April 1999. In June the predominantly Malay yet multi-ethnic 
and multi-religious PKN united with PAS, the DAP, and the PRM to create the Barisan Alternatif. 
The Reformasi movement altered the country’s political culture. Jomo26 describes the transformation as the 
liberation of the Malaysian, and particularly of Malay political discourse. The movement discovered the Internet 
as a useful medium that served in exchanging up-to-date information and developing a collec- tive identity.27 More 
than 50 Reformasi-related websites were created (Laman Reformasi, freeMalaysia, and so forth), as were 
discussion groups such as Sang- kancil. Malaysiakini also asserted itself as the first critical and popular daily Inter- 
net newspaper. Large parts of the population realized that the state security forces and a judiciary obviously 
subservient to Mahathir had manipulated the Anwar trial by employing all sorts of questionable methods. 
In the lead-up to the November 1999 elections, the opposition experienced an unprecedented political ascent.28 
The fact that a social movement was smoothly and quickly transformed into such a party alliance is testimony to 
the peculiarities of competitive electoral authoritarianism. Incentives for civil society actors and party activists to 
partake in elections are strong. This means that investing in electoral politics yields higher revenues than merely 
relying on ‘street politics’. 
The BA parties were widely regarded as forces of reform (DAP and PKN) or as an Islamist alternative (PAS).29 The 
PAS stronghold lay in the northern states of Kelantan, Terengganu, and Kedah. The party maintained a closely 
knit network of religious leaders and Islamic schools, right down to the village level. The PKN was relatively 
heterogeneous in its composition. The main factions in the party were NGO activists, former UMNO officials 
around Anwar Ibrahim, and functionaries of the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement, Angkatan Belia Islam 
Malaysia. The party was mostly based in urban West Malaysian areas and had  its following essentially among 
sections of the middle classes and – to a lesser extent – lower classes. The DAP had been established in 1966 as 
an offshoot of the Singaporean People’s Action Party shortly after the merger of Singapore and Malaya failed. 
The party gained a strong following, especially in urban areas, among ethnic Chinese dissatisfied with the pro-
Bumiputera policy and the failures of the MCA. 
Political party opposition as well as NGOs are today based on an ethnically and religiously diversified middle class. 
This has surely contributed to the rapproche- ment among opposition parties. Within PAS this has created the 
space for pragmatists who have sought to cooperate with non-Muslims. Thus, prior to the elections in November 
1999 the traditional rivalry between PAS and the DAP was of minor importance.30 The joint BA manifesto 
‘Towards a Just Malaysia’ of October 1999 did not contain any Islamist demands by the PAS and all parties 
agreed on a very liberal agenda. They demanded that the draconian Internal Security Act be abolished, and 
campaigned for freedom of the press. Generally, they criticized not only Mahathir and the BN but also the demise 
of an erstwhile independent judiciary, the incapacity of the police to guarantee internal security, the failures of 
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the anti-corruption agency, and the partisan press. The manifesto emphasized the fight against poverty, 
corruption, and abuse of authority. Furthermore, there was a strong desire for increased inter-cultural and inter-
religious dialogue. 
During the election campaign PAS did not focus on its Islamist agenda and in general attracted more people at its 
public gatherings (ceramah) than the UMNO. Similarly to its coalition partners, PAS criticized Mahathir’s 
government for its authoritarianism and corruption. The BN, on the other hand, tried to discredit PAS, just like 
during previous elections, as a dangerous Islamist party, and used the mainstream media to highlight controversial 
comments by PAS politicians. The DAP was in a predicament since it was fighting UMNO as well as PAS as far 
as the Islamization of Malaysia was concerned. Lastly, the collective protest against UMNO and Mahathir’s abuse 
of power, or the ‘Anwar factor’, was respon- sible for the relative success of the BA. 
The BN attained only one-half of the Malay votes. It achieved 148 out of 193 seats in the national parliament 
while the BA garnered 42 seats (PAS, 27 seats; DAP, 10 seats; PKN, five seats) and the Parti Bersatu Sabah only 
three seats  (see Table 1). BN hegemony was most intense in the Borneo states Sabah and Sarawak and in the 
south of the peninsula (Johore, Negeri Sembilan, Selangor). Due to the great decline in Malay votes, the number 
of UMNO seats decreased from 88 (1995) to 72 (1999). The good results of the MCA offset some of the losses, 
but BN votes still fell from 65% to 56%, and for the first time since 1959 UMNO won fewer votes than its 
coalition partners combined. The party did par- ticularly poorly amongst orthodox Muslims. Funston31 thus 
speaks of a total defeat by ulama (Islamic scholars) close to UMNO that can be viewed as a  result of frustration 
with the official version of Islam. The overall weight of the party within the BN sank. Ever since, Mahathir has 
had to rely more on the support of ethnic minorities. 
PAS won 27 seats (in 1995, seven seats) in the Dewan Rakyat, the national par- liament, and majorities in the state 
parliaments of Kelantan and Terengganu. In all states combined it captured 98 out of 113 BA seats, while in 1995 
it had only managed to acquire 34 in these parliaments. The other BA coalition partners could not reach their 
goals: the DAP obtained only 10 seats, the PKN five seats, and the PRM none at all. The DAP, which had won 
20 seats in 1990, profited least from the alliance with PAS and the PKN. Evidently, many Chinese supported the 
MCA instead since they feared PAS and its Islamist views. The results for the PKN came as a disappointment to 
many of its supporters. These were not surprising, however, bearing in mind that the party had only had a few 
months to set up its organizational machinery. 
The 1999 elections were – seen from the perspective of the ruling elites – a perfect device for defusing discontent. 
This phenomenon in protracted transitions is described by Eisenstadt: 
 
the channelling of opposition into the electoral arena served the authoritarian incum- bent by getting strikers, students, and 
other potentially disruptive trouble makers ‘off the regime’s back’, and out of the unpredictable realm of street 
demonstrations and picket lines and into the highly regulated realm of campaigns and elections.32 
 
The polls were not a major breakthrough for the opposition, in particular the DAP and the PKN. The DAP realized 
that the uneasy relationship with PAS was costly in the face of a Chinese electorate that feared ongoing Islamization. 
Yet, the elections proved wrong those who surmised that electoral authoritarianism in Malaysia was too entrenched 
to allow the opposition to undercut BN hegemony. This BN predo- minance suffered a major blow. UMNO’s 
legitimacy, already undermined by the abuses of the New Economic Policy, was decisively shaken by the Anwar 
affair. According to Brownlee,33 ruling parties such as UMNO usually mediate con- flict and generate political 
influence that reduces individual insecurity. Moreover, they ‘create a structure for collective agenda setting, 
lengthening the time horizon on which leaders weigh gains and losses’.34 These ruling parties generate incen- 
tives for long-term loyalty, and they decrease intra-elite factionalism. But as of 1998/1999 UMNO was no 
longer an example of a ruling party that stabilized the regime – the conflict in the same year was never 
really solved. After the sacking and incarceration of Anwar Ibrahim in 1998, the hegemony of the BN was 
questioned. Supported by the vibrant Internet media and backed by parts of the middle class, a new form of 
cooperation between political parties and civil society actors came into being. The seeds were sown for an 
opposition movement unprecedented in Malaysia’s history. The Reformasi movement and the 1999 elec- tions 
could thus be seen as the first phase in a protracted transition and a part of the ‘continuous and prolonged struggle 
over the formal institutional playing field’.35 The main condition necessary for producing an enduring alliance 
was still missing. The PAS– DAP coalition that was already characterized by major political differences was too 
brittle to withstand the typical onslaught of authoritarianism – sheer state repression. Accordingly, the BA started 
to slowly dissolve not long after the polls. In January 2000 Karpal Singh (DAP vice chairman), Marina Yusof (PKN 
vice chairwoman), Ezam Noor (leader of the PKN Youth), Zulkifli Sulong (Harakah editor), and others were 
arrested under the Sedition Act or the Official Secrets Act. Then, public rallies were banned in Kuala Lumpur, 
among other places. PAS was only allowed to publish the biweekly Harakah twice a month. The licences of 
three monthlies, Detik, Wasilah, and Tamaddun, were not renewed under the restrictive Printing Presses and 
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Publications Act. Meanwhile, the show trial against Anwar Ibrahim continued. In August 2000 he was sentenced 
to nine years in prison for ‘sexual misconduct’. In early November 2000 the BA attempted to hold a rally north 
of Kuala Lumpur, at which 100,000 participants were expected, yet most demonstrators did not reach the venue 
owing to numerous road blocks and the use of tear gas and batons. This incident at Kesas Highway36 and, also, 
the surprising success in November in the Lunas (Kedah) by-elections37 demonstrated that the BA was still able 
to mobilize the masses, but soon after it began to disintegrate. 
 
 
The dissolution of the Barisan Alternatif 
In the following years the BA broke apart due to state repression, an international political environment 
advantageous for the BN, and a recovering economy. One of the main reason was the tactical miscalculation of 
some PAS leaders. This break- down also has to be evaluated against the background of a strained relationship 
with the DAP. 
In April 2001, 10 more PKN members, who had allegedly planned to over- throw the government, were arrested. 
In July the ban on political rallies was extended to ceramah. In August 10 more people were detained; most of 
them were PAS members, including Nik Adli, the son of Kelantan chief minister Nik Aziz, and they were accused 
of belonging to the terrorist group Kumpulan Mujahedin Malaysia (Mujahedin Group Malaysia). All of these 
repressive measures prevented the opposition from consolidating. The PKN party leadership operated virtually 
on the edge of illegality, even more so than its coalition partners.38 
After 11 September 2001 the campaign against PAS was reinforced. When the DAP left the alliance because of 
the intransigent Islamist attitude of PAS, the BA shattered altogether. Mahathir intensified Malaysia’s collaboration 
with the United States and legitimized his actions against the opposition as part of the ‘war on terror’. He depicted 
PAS as a fundamentalist group and implicated a link between the party and terrorist networks. On 29 September 
2001, shortly after the DAP had left the BA, he declared that Malaysia was already an Islamic state in order to 
take the wind out of PAS Islamists’ sails. Although the prime minister may have had a moderate form of Islam in 
mind (without hudud39 punishments and with expli- cit toleration of other religions), his remarks came as a shock to 
the Chinese and the Indians.40 Islam was the state religion, yet Malaysia had by no means ever been an Islamic 
state. Therefore, the DAP started the nationwide ‘no to 911, no to 929’ cam- paign and demanded that Mahathir 
retract his statement. 
PAS slowly began to distance itself from the BA Common Manifesto of 1999. The party decided to introduce a 
particularly reactionary form of the Islamic penal code in Terengganu.41 The PAS reaction to Mahathir’s statement 
of 29 September 2001 came on 12 November 2003, with the publication of a blueprint for an Islamic state. The 53-
page ‘Dokumen Negara Islam’ (‘The Islamic State Document’) had been announced some time previously. It had 
been written under the auspices of the party’s purists and was published in the face of the resistance of pragmatists 
such as Hatta Ramli, Nasharuddin Mat Isa, and Solahuddin.42 In the document, shari’a (Islamic religious law) 
signifies the highest legal system and also the main inspi- ration for all state activity. Its introduction is meant 
to purify the entire society. 
The document roughly depicts the major goals and characteristics of an Islamic state. 
Leading politicians from the other opposition parties criticized the document. The PKN was very concerned about 
its publication; the DAP considered its fears confirmed, and the party’s secretary general publicly announced that 
the DAP would withdraw from all official posts in Kelantan and Terengganu, the two states controlled by PAS. 
Accordingly, prior to the elections in March 2004, political party opposition reached one of its lowest points due 
to the split with the DAP, the controversy about terrorist dangers in Southeast Asia, and the ‘Dokumen Negara 
Islam’. In contrast, the BN was much more cohesive. The government was able to present impressive economic 
successes and had also regained some popularity with its new prime minister, Abdullah Badawi, who had taken 
office in 2003. UMNO’s 2004 elections success was to a large extent  due  to  the  widespread endorsement of its 
new leader who represented a moderate form of Islam, vowed to fight corruption and had a reputation of being 
far more conciliatory than his predecessor Mahathir. 
Thus, in the 2004 elections, the BN received 64.4% of the votes and secured 198 out of 219 seats in the national 
parliament and 505 out of 552 seats at the state level (see Table 1).43 UMNO won 93.2% of the seats it had fought for 
(109 out of 117); in 1999 it had won merely 48.6%. In most state parliaments, opposition barely existed any more. In 
nine of these parliaments only two opposition representatives remained. Especially in East Malaysia (Sabah and 
Sarawak), the BN had almost asserted a pol- itical monopoly. Pre-Reformasi conditions were thus re-established. 
PAS was rep- resented by only seven MPs and had lost its majority in Terengganu. The DAP was able to recover 
but did not repeat its 1990 success with 20 seats. The biggest losses were undoubtedly sustained by PAS and the 
Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) (People’s Justice Party), the product of a fusion of the PKN and the socialist PRM, 
which won only in one constituency. 
All in all, the fragile cooperation between PAS and the DAP dissolved quickly because of heavy-handed 
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manoeuvres by PAS purists and the Machiavellian politics of Mahathir. Moreover, UMNO’s legitimacy was 
restored due to a stabilized economy; the widespread belief – after 11 September, 2001 – in a serious Islamist 




Transformation since 2004 
After the 2004 elections, then, the opposition was in shambles and the Reformasi movement seemed to have run 
out of steam. Nonetheless, the opposition parties would be able to reconstitute itself within a few years. The more 
they have sensed the opportunity to undermine the ruling coalition, the more they have tended to cooperate. As 
long as the opposition is divided, the weaknesses of the ruling coalition do not weigh heavily. But if political 
party opposition is transformed, this can have enormous consequences, and ‘they can dramatically reduce the 
survival of an authoritarian regime and influence its transition to democracy’.44 
This process commenced with the unexpected release of Anwar Ibrahim in September 2004. He quickly became 
the opposition leader. In December 2004 the PKR assembly in Ipoh turned out to be the new beginning of a party 
that  had suffered from paralysing factionalism in its early years. The influence of a group of ABIM activists was 
decisively weakened.45 
In parallel to this process, PAS began to soften its stance and sought rapproche- ment with the PKR and the DAP. 
Based on the party’s success in the 1999 elections, the purists within the PAS leadership such as Abdul Hadi 
Awang had believed they could increase their influence and even win majorities in the states of Kedah and Perlis 
by stressing an Islamist agenda. However, the results of the 2004 elections had demonstrated that not only the 
religious minorities but also the majority of Malay voters did not endorse plans either to introduce the hudud or 
to establish an Islamic state. Therefore, at the party congress in August 2004 President Abdul Hadi Awang, a 
conservative ulama, was openly criticized.46 As a result of such criticism, aimed at the entire ulama faction, 
another special, non-public party assembly was held in December of that year.47 The subject of discussion was 
the confidential ‘post-mortem report’, a detailed analysis of the defeat in the elections that had been compiled by 
a special commission. One month later PAS publicly, and unexpectedly, announced that it would tone down the 
Islamic-state issue. The party was willing to re-address the compromise that had been agreed upon in 1999 and 
expressed in the BA manifesto. Furthermore, reformers seized important positions in the party elections in 2005 
and 2007. In 2007 Nasharuddin Mat Isa won against the conservative ulama Harun Taib and, thus, had his post 
as deputy president confirmed. Husam Musa and Mohamad Sabu were elected as vice presidents. New 
recruitment patterns and voter bases contributed to this rise of reformist politicians within PAS. Many 
professionals have only recently joined the party and have increasingly challenged ulama orthodoxy.48 
Reforms within PAS and the moderating influence of Anwar led to a convergence of the opposition partners.49 
The DAP tried to cooperate with other opposition parties without forging formalized alliances. In contrast  to the 
case  in the 1980s and 1990s, the PKR was able to bridge the divide separating the secularism of the DAP and the 
Islamism of PAS. Anwar Ibrahim embodied a moderate form of orthodox Islam as well as a commitment to multi-
ethnicity  and multi-religiosity. The DAP and PAS, therefore, were willing to work together informally.50 
Parallel to this rapprochement among the opposition parties, the mobilization of civil society actors resulted in a 
political revival that reminded observers of the Reformasi movement of 1998/1999. On 10 November 2007 at 
least 30,000 people demonstrated in Kuala Lumpur.51 The prohibited protest was organized by Bersih – the 
‘Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections’ (Gabungan Pilihanraya Bersih dan Adil), an alliance comprising 70 
political parties and non-governmental organizations, among them the PKR, the DAP, PAS, and the Malaysian 
Trade Union Congress as well as various human rights organizations. These protests in particular were part of 
what Schedler describes as a two-level game typical of electoral authoritarian systems. The ‘game of electoral 
competition and the meta-game of electoral reform unfold in a simultaneous as well as interactive fashion’.52 The 
opposition parties thus used the legitimate public debate on election laws to highlight the obvious manipulations 
undertaken by the ruling coalition. 
Another huge protest rally took place on 25 November 2007; 10,000 – 30,000 people gathered in Kuala Lumpur 
under the banner of the Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf). The organization speaks out against the perceived 
discrimination and marginalization of the Indian Hindu minority. It articulates the Hindu community’s disillusion 
with both pro-Bumiputera policies and UMNO’s rhetoric of Ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy). The protests 
were triggered inter alia by temple demolitions in the preceding months. 
The Bersih and the Hindraf protests, where the police used tear gas and water cannons against the demonstrators, 
were to a large extent organized via and amplified by new media such as YouTube, Malaysiakini; blogs, such as 
those by Jeff Ooi, Ronnie Liu, and Ahirudin Attan;53 and the independent news portal ‘Malaysia today’, run by 
Raja Petra Kamaruddin.54 
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These media have become a key means for opposition groups to disseminate information. Moreover, there are 
now many social networking websites and fora that circumvent the official media. In 1999, according to Abbott, 
the Internet ‘provided an important catalytic impact on critical social voices in Malaysia’ and ‘facilitated greater 
communication and cooperation between disparate groups in civil society, and .. . across ethnic lines’.55 In 2000, 
there were 3.7 million Internet users in the country. As of 2008 this figure has risen to 14 million with a 60% 
penetration rate.56 During election night on 8 March 2008, Malaysiakini had over half a million visitors an hour. 
Even in rural areas, printouts of the opposition’s online information, updated daily, were distributed.57 Although 
the Internet is overwhelmingly an urban middle-class phenomenon, ‘[t]he reality is that kampong folk and those 
in rural areas now have kith and kin who have moved to the towns and cities. And like a bad review of a restaurant 
that multiplies itself effortlessly by word or mouth, unflattering information, true or false, travels even faster with 
cyberworld denizens, who then spread the word outside it’.58 
Efforts by the BN to confine the new Internet freedom have been mostly in vain. Examples include the 
confiscation of Malaysiakini’s computers in 2003 and the suing of two bloggers by the New Straits Times for 
defamation in 2007. Acts such as these have tended to increase solidarity among Internet community activists. In 
addition, the Communications and Multimedia Act of 1998, which  is part of the Malaysian attempt to transform 
the country into a regional centre for information and communication technology, guarantees free data traffic.59 
Today it is much harder for the government to heavy-handedly repress opposition than in the 1970s or 1980s. 
A range of scandals implicating high-ranking officials and top politicians have been highlighted recently. One 
telling example is the so-called Lingam tape, which was shot with a camera-equipped mobile phone. It lays bare 
how major appointments in the judiciary are decided upon. The affair led to a ‘Walk of Justice’ through Putrajaya 
on 26 September 2007 by 2000 lawyers and supporters. The government eventually set up a fact-finding 
commission to ease pressure ahead of the elections.60 Another example of the impact of the Internet on street 
protests and on politics is the electoral nomination of bloggers without political experience. One of the most 
prominent among them, Jeff Ooi, is now member  of parliament for the DAP. 
Even former prime minister Mahathir discovered the new media. A few times he spoke exclusively to 
Malaysiakini, seeing the Internet as an ideal forum to express his growing criticism of his successor and the 
governing coalition. In August 2006 he demanded Badawi’s resignation and thus further undermined Badawi’s 
position, which was already impaired due to the lack of political reforms made.61 
 
The 2008 elections and the Pakatan Rakyat 
In the lead-up to the March 2008 elections, the whole complex of new media, mobilized civil society forces, and 
closely cooperating opposition parties pro- duced, for the second time after 1998, an enormous reform 
momentum. At the same time, the legitimacy of the BN, especially of the MCA, the MIC and Gerakan, was at its 
nadir. A survey by the Merdeka Centre in January 2008, for example, demonstrated that only 38% of the Indians 
and 42% of the Chinese were satisfied with the performance of Abdullah Badawi.62 This was a steep decline in 
comparison with approval rates a few months earlier. 
In February 2008 the opposition agreed on nominating only one candidate per constituency from within their 
ranks. Moreover, PAS avoided discussions on the shari’a-based penal code and the Islamic state issue. Because 
of the conjunction of all these factors, and despite the usual electoral manipulations, the BN lost its majority in 
West Malaysia (49.8%). UMNO, the MCA, and the MIC  all  suffered huge losses (see Table 1).63 The MIC 
defended only three out of nine Dewan Rakyat seats and six out of 19 seats in state parliaments. Gerakan lost all 
its seats in its stronghold Penang, where it had governed continuously since 1969. The party achieved merely two 
seats at the federal level compared with the 10 seats in 2004. The MCA also suffered a resounding defeat and fell 
from 31 seats in 2004 to 15 seats in 2008. At the state level they lost in 59 out of 90 constituencies. These routs 
of the Chinese parties were ascribed to disappointment over the weak position of Gerakan and the MCA in relation 
to UMNO within the ruling coalition and as protest votes against Malay chauvinism and the corruption of the BN 
parties.64 
The BN garnered 51% of the votes and 63% of the seats at the federal level, with particularly clear majorities in 
Johor, UMNO’s power base, and the East Malaysian states of Sarawak and Sabah, where it won in 30 out of 31 
and 24 out of 25 constituencies, respectively, for the national parliament. The opposition won 82 seats in the national 
parliament and, what is more important, majorities in five of 13 states. They gained 22 out of 36 seats (PAS, 16 
seats; PKR, five seats; DAP, one seat) in Kedah, 39 out of 45 (PAS, 38 seats; PKR, one seat) in Kelantan, 29 out 
of 40 (DAP, 19 seats; PKR, nine seats; PAS, one seat) in Penang, 31 out of 59 (DAP, 18 seats; PKR, seven seats; 
PAS, six seats) in Perak, and 36 out of 56 (PKR, 15 seats; DAP, 13 seats; PAS, eight seats) in Selangor. 
In contrast to the 2004 elections, this time opposition parties were particularly successful in constituencies with a 
heterogeneous ethnic composition (mixed seats) because ethnic minorities turned away from the BN. According 
to Ong,65 58% of the Malays but only 35% of the Chinese and 48% of the Indians voted for BN can- didates in 
9 
 
Peninsular Malaysia. The swing from the BN towards the opposition amounted to five percentage points among 
Malays, 30 percentage points among the Chinese and 35 percentage points among the Indians.66 Particularly 
among the latter group, there has been a decisive change of mood. This has been demon- strated, for example, by 
the endorsement of Anwar Ibrahim: 51% of the Malaysians but 90% of the Indians agreed more or less with the 
statement that Anwar is a strong and visionary leader.67 The Indian vote was one  of the main differences in 
comparison with the 1999 elections. The Hindraf protests a few months prior to the elections marked the first 
time that this Indian resentment was forcefully articulated. This was the clearest sign of the BN legitimacy crisis. 
It was also interpreted as a protest vote against the pro-Bumiputera policy and the perceived marginalization of 
the Indians. 
Owing to the devastating results, some of the BN party leaders such as Samy Vellu (MIC) and Koh Tsu Koon 
(Gerakan) have come under enormous pressure. MCA president Ong Ka Ting was replaced in October 2008 by 
Ong Tee Keat. Even Abdullah Badawi was openly criticized within his own party.68 Since the criticism did not 
die away, Badawi eventually declared, in October, his intended resignation as of UMNO general assembly in 
March 2009, where he made way for his deputy, Najib Razak. Yet, Najib himself is vulnerable due to rumours 
about his involvement in a range of corruption scandals and the murder of the Mongolian model Altantuya.69 
The sensational results have vindicated the strategy of PAS pragmatists. Obviously, the entire opposition – 
politicians as well as many voters – has learned from past experiences. On 1 April 2008, PAS, the DAP, and the 
PKR formed the Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Alliance), a formalized alliance. The opposi- tion now has the 
opportunity to demonstrate good governance and to reintroduce local elections in Kedah, Kelantan, Penang, 
Perak, and Selangor. Since the BN has lost its two-thirds majority, the opposition is also able to block 
constitutional amendments.70 Moreover, the Pakatan Rakyat can now provide ample jobs for party officials and 
patronage possibilities for the party rank and file.71 
Political transitions are highly contingent political processes in which ‘the dynamics of opposition groups and 
the degree to which they coalesce can be viewed as a tipping game’.72 This is illustrated by the sudden change of 
mood by Chinese and, especially, Indian voters and by the possibility of widespread party- switching. For a few 
months, until September 2008, the Pakatan Rakyat intended to convince 30 members of parliament to defect from 
the ruling coalition to the opposition. One way to entice members of parliament from Sarawak and Sabah, two 
economically backward states in East Malaysia, was to promise to raise oil/ gas revenues for these states from the 
present 5% to 20% should the Pakatan Rakyat form the government in Kuala Lumpur. Another lure was the promise 
to appoint members of indigenous ethnic groups such as the Iban and the Kadazandusun to the highest executive 
positions.73 Political transitions can be understood as the ‘rapid movement from one power equilibrium to another, 
in the course of which a majority of political forces moves from one coalition to another. The incumbent had a 
winning majority but loses it, thanks to defections of key elements to the oppo- sition’.74 Yet, it has turned out that the 
risks of defecting are still too high for MPs. 
Transitions are times of uncertainty, yet the incentives for opposition parties to cooperate are high. The change of 
government in several states has increased the necessity of the opposition coming to terms with each other. It has 
also entailed a certain decentralization within the three parties.75 In PAS, the focus on the traditional stronghold 
in the northern part of the peninsula has been widened. Arguably, this strengthens the position of the 




Since contention in electoral authoritarian systems centres on the electoral arena, political parties occupy a 
strategic position. In particular, the creation of a multi- party coalition can affect the electoral dynamic 
tremendously and may cause ‘liberalizing electoral outcomes which provide at least a chance for a new begin- 
ning in each of these countries. In fact, many of them liberalize to the point that they can eventually be considered 
electoral democracies’.76 
Yet, political party opposition in Malaysia after independence was weak and fragmented for more than 40 years, 
and only since 1998 has the opposition trans- formed into a strong and reasonably cohesive alliance. Even then the 
first coalition, the BA, did not endure, and crumbled after a few years due to internal rifts com- bined with 
repressive measures on the part of the state apparatus. However, the second coalition, the People’s Alliance 
(Pakatan Rakyat), which emerged shortly after the 2008 elections, seems to have learned from past mistakes and 
is today more threatening to the ruling elite than the BA ever was. Before 1998 non- competitive elections and 
multipartyism were effective instruments for stabilizing the regime, with elections merely ‘a safety valve for 
regulating societal discontent and confining the opposition’.77 But today an efficient political party opposition has 
significantly stirred up the electoral authoritarian arrangements. 
The analysis offered here has illustrated that five factors have led to the metamorphosis of political party 
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opposition in Malaysia. These combined factors are: the emergence of pro-democratic segments within a multi-
ethnic and multi-religious middle class; the widespread interaction of political parties and civil society forces, 
which has spawned unprecedented protest, particularly in 1998/1999 and 2007; the extraordinary impact of new 
media such as Internet newspapers, blogs, forums, and so forth, on the formation of common ideas    and strategies 
within the Reformasi movement; the eroded legitimacy of the BN; and the much-increased influence of 
pragmatists on decision-making within the Islamist PAS. 
Whereas the transformation within the middle class and the shifts in the media sector (and, partly, the stimulation 
of civil society forces) are consequences of long- term structural change, PAS reforms and the BN’s legitimacy 
crisis are, in turn, effects of actors’ strategic choices or of short-term developments. The opposition has been able 
to challenge the regime only because the legitimacy of the ruling parties rests on the permission of a limited 
amount of political contestation. This has enabled the opposition to destabilize the normal equilibrium of control 
and competition maintained by the regime. Previously, the ruling elites have been capable of restoring this 
equilibrium through a combination of cunning manipu- lation and sheer repression, yet today in Malaysia these 
measures are tending to make matters worse. The opportunity structures for collective contention are differ- ent now 
compared with the pre-Reformasi era. The Reformasi movement and the Bersih and Hindraf protests elicited a 
forceful response by the regime because  of the imminent elections. There has been a clear linkage between street 
protests, government repression and the mobilization of opposition voters by political parties. This mobilization 
was strongly facilitated by the adroit use of new media. Moreover, the much-widened political opportunities for 
parties  after 1998 have slowly brought together the DAP, the PKR and PAS into the Pakatan Rakyat alliance. 
The Reformasi movement and the 1999 elections reshaped the configuration of forces and, since then, Malaysian 
politics has changed. But the elections also  demonstrated the power of the BN. The regime was under pressure, 
but, because of the typical restraints of electoral authoritarianism, political party opposition was still far removed 
from taking over power. This disillusionment may have  contributed to the dissolution of the BA and the 
devastating results in the 2004 elections. Only after that disaster did opposition parties, especially PAS, start to 
change their strategies. In the next elections, in March 2008, they competed with the BN parties from a much 
stronger position. The elections in 1999 and 2008 were transitional, not foundational, since they were part of an 
extended and ongoing series of interactions between the state (or the BN) and the opposition. 
In this vein, Howard and Roessler state that an electoral authoritarian system 
 
rests on a paradox: it is stable as long as the incumbent is capable of controlling the elec- toral process, yet inherently unstable since 
regularly held elections provide a significant opportunity for opposition movements to effectively challenge authoritarian 
incum- bents In other words, major political change is never certain, but it is often possible. 
And while incumbents have become deft at securing reelection, opposition movements can and do sometimes overcome the 
fundamentally flawed process.78 
 
Therefore, in many cases, multiparty elections stabilize electoral authoritarian regimes – but sometimes they 
produce unintended results. Strong opposition by political parties may raise the awareness of the wider public 
that regime change is possible. It may also entail a splitting of regime elites. The ruling coalition  can lose 
cohesion, and cracks lead to visible strife. Yet, any such transition in Malaysia is thus far proceeding only slowly 
because the BN is still too cohesive and has too many vested interests to allow a comprehensive elite desertion 
or a split between hardliners and softliners. So far, there has been no major split among regime elites,79 with only 
minor defections from the ruling alliance.     For instance, de facto law minister Zaid Ibrahim resigned in 
September 2008 in protest over the use of the Internal Security Act,80 and the Sabah Progressive Party left the 
BN a few months after the 2008 elections. But such incidents do not unduly threaten the current regime coalition, 
and its viability was also demon- strated by developments in Perak in February 2009, where the BN took over the 
state government after the defection of four BA assemblymen. 
There are also other caveats that limit the likelihood of regime change. The Pakatan Rakyat alliance is still fragile, 
with the relationship between PAS and the DAP being particularly tense. At times, the DAP has gained electoral  
support precisely by keeping its distance from PAS, while PAS itself could  easily revert to purist Islamism. Even 
the track record of Anwar Ibrahim, formerly part of the Mahathir regime, remains dubious to many in the 
opposition.81 
Thus the future is uncertain. On the one hand, it remains possible that the BN will be able to restore its hegemony, 
as it did in the 2001 – 2004 period. On the other hand, if the BN splits and enough parliamentarians switch to the 
opposition, a quick takeover is conceivable. Moreover, next time around the opposition could win in ‘stunning 
elections’,82 yet the BN could conceivably then try to ‘steal’ these elections. This may entail a new round of 
government repression and a showdown between regime and opposition. A regime under pressure can resort to 
violence and dirty tricks, thus losing legitimacy and propelling a self-destructive dynamic of protest and repression. 
The more the regime may try to subdue opposi- tion, the more it is likely to lose legitimacy.83 
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At this point in time it seems most probable that Malaysia will democratize incrementally through several 
transitional, not foundational, elections. This process is likely to be accompanied by a successive empowerment 
of civil society and political party opposition. Hence a protracted transition is the most likely scenario. 
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Howard,  Marc  Morjé,  and  Philip  G.  Roessler,  ‘Liberalizing  Electoral  Outcomes  in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes’, 
American Journal of Political Science 50 (April 
2006): 362 – 78. 
Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 
Hwang, In-Wong. Personalized Politics. The Malaysian State under Mahathir. Singapore: ISEAS, 2003. 
Jesudason, James V. ‘The Syncretic State and the Structuring of Oppositional Politics in Malaysia’. In Political Opposition 
in Industrialising Asia, ed. Garry Rodan, 128–60. London: Routledge, 1996. 
Jomo, K.S. ‘Acknowledgements’. In Malaysian Eclipse. Economic Crisis and Recovery, ed. 
K.S. Jomo, xv–xxi. London: Zed Books, 2001. 
Jomo, K.S. Malaysian Eclipse. Economic Crisis and Recovery. London: Zed Books, 2001. Khoo Boo Teik. Beyond Mahathir. 
Malaysian Politics and its Discontents. London: Zed 
Books, 2003. . 
Lai, Brian, and Ruth Melkonian-Hoover. ‘Democratic Progress and Regress: The Effect of Parties on the Transitions of States 
to and Away from Democracy’. Political Research Quarterly 58 (2005): 551–64. 
Lee Hwok Aun. ‘Development Policies, Affirmative Action and the New Politics in Malaysia’. In The State, Economic 
Development and Ethnic Co-Existence in Malaysia and New Zealand, ed. Edmund Terence Gomez and Robert Stephens, 29–
52. Kuala Lumpur: Centre for Economic Development and Ethnic Relations, University of Malaya, 2003. 
Levitsky, Stephen, and Lucian A. Way. ‘Elections Without Democracy. The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism’. Journal 
of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 51–65. 
Liew Chin Tong. ‘PAS Leadership: New Faces and Old Constraints’. In Southeast Asian Affairs 2007, ed. Daljit Singh and 
Lorraine C. Salazar, 201–13. Singapore: ISEAS, 2007. 
Liew Chin Tong. ‘PAS Politics: Defining an Islamic State in Legitimacy’. Politics in Malaysia: The Malay Dimension, ed. 
Edmund Terence Gomez, 107–37. London: Routledge, 2007. 
Lim Hong Hai, and Ong Kian Ming. ‘The 2004 General Election and the Electoral Process in Malaysia’. In Between 
Consolidation and Crisis. Elections and Democracy in Five Nations in Southeast Asia, ed. Aurel Croissant and Beate Martin,  
147–214. Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 2006. 
Loh Kok Wah, Francis. ‘Developmentalism and the Limits of Democratic Discourse’. In Democracy in Malaysia. Discourses 
and Practices, ed. Francis Loh Kok Wah and Khoo Boo Teik, 19–50. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2002. 
Loh Kok Wah, Francis, and Johan Saravanamuttu, eds. New Politics in Malaysia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2003. 
Lyall, Jason M.K. ‘Pocket Protests: Rhetorical Coercion and the Micropolitics of Collective Action in Semiauthoritarian 
Regimes’. World Politics 58 (2006): 378–412. 
Marzuki, Mohamad. ‘Legal Coercion, Legal Meanings and UMNO’s Legitimacy’. In Politics in Malaysia: The Malay 
Dimension, ed. Edmund Terence Gomez, 24–49. London: Routledge, 2007. 
Merdeka Center, Q3/2008 Peninsula Malaysia Voter Opinion Poll. Bandar Baru Bangi, 2008 
Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani. ‘Media Freedom in Malaysia’. Journal of Contemporary Asia 
35 (2005): 341–67. 
14 
 
O’Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C. Schmitter. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about 
Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. 
Ong Kian Ming. ‘Making Sense of the Political Tsunami’. Malaysiakini, March 11, 2008. Oon Yeoh. Tipping Points. 
Viewpoints on the Reasons for and Impact of the March 8 Election Earthquake, ed. Oon Yeoh. Petaling Jaya: The Edge 
Communications, 2008. 
Pepinsky, Thomas B. ‘Malaysia: Turnover Without Change’. Journal of Democracy 18, no. 1 (2007): 113–27. 
Przeworski, Adam. ‘Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy’. In Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Comparative Perspectives, ed. Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, 47–63. Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. 
Saravanamuttu, Johan. ‘Is there a Politics of the Malaysian Middle Class?’. Southeast Asian Middle Classes. Prospects for 
Social Change and Democratisation, ed. Abdul Rahman Embong, 103–118. Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2001. 
Schedler, Andreas. ‘Elections Without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation’. Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 36–
50. 
Schedler, Andreas. ‘The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism’. In Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree 
Competition, ed. Andreas Schedler, 1–26. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006. 
Schedler, Andreas. ‘The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections’. International Political Science Review 23 (2002): 
103–22. 
Sim Kwang Yang. ‘Can we Trust  Anwar?’. Political  Tsunami.  An  End to  Hegemony  in Malaysia?, ed. Nathaniel Tan and 
John Lee, 174–8. Kuala Lumpur: Kinibooks, 2008. 
Tan, Jun-E, and Zawawi Ibrahim. Blogging and Democratization in Malaysia. A New Civil Society in the Making. Petaling 
Jaya: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre, 2008. 
Tan, Nathaniel, and John Lee, eds. Political Tsunami. An End to Hegemony in Malaysia?, Kuala Lumpur: Kinibooks, 2008. 
Thirkell-White, Tristram B. ‘Political Islam and Malaysian Democracy’. Democratization 
13 (2006): 421–41. 
Ufen, Andreas. ‘The 2008 Elections in Malaysia. Uncertainties of Electoral Authoritarianism’. Taiwan Journal of Democracy 
3 (July 2008): 155–69. 
Van de Walle, Nicolas. ‘Tipping Games: When Do Opposition Parties Coalesce?’. In Electoral Authoritarianism: The 
Dynamics of Unfree Competition, ed. Andreas Schedler, 77–94. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006. 
Weiss, Meredith L. Protest and Possibilities. Civil Society and Coalitions for Political Change in Malaysia. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2006. 
Welsh, Bridget. ‘Real Change? Elections in the Reformasi Era’. In The State of Malaysia: Ethnicity, Equity and Reform, ed. 
Edmund Terence Gomez, 130–56. London: Routledge, 2004. 
Wong, Kean. ‘Kingmaker Web 2.0’. Development and Cooperation 6 (2008): 240–1. 
 
